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EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE
U.S. COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE:





The Customs and International Trade Bar Association
("CITBA") has proposed several expansions in the jurisdiction
of the U.S. Court of International Trade ("CIT"). CITBA, estab-
lished in the 1910's as the Association of the Customs Bar, is
the bar association of lawyers who regularly appear before the
CIT and are engaged in the practice of law under U.S. tariff,
customs, international trade, and related laws and regulations.
CITBA's proposals on expanded jurisdiction of the CIT are set
out in two reports adopted by CITBA's Board of Directors in
1994. In the belief that the ideas continue to represent valid
proposals for expanding the court's jurisdiction, the reports
formed the basis for a presentation at a plenary session of the
Eleventh Judicial Conference of the CIT in December 1999,
examining the role of the CIT in the twenty-first century.'
* Mr. Reed is a partner in the New York law firm of Wasserman, Schnei-
der, Babb & Reed. His practice concentrates on United States customs, interna-
tional trade, and import-export regulatory laws. Mr. Reed has been a member of
the Board of Directors of the Customs and International Trade Bar Association
(CITBA) since 1995. He is a member of Bars of New York and the District of
Columbia, and received an A.B. from Indiana University, a J.D. from Columbia
University School of Law, and a Ph.D. from The Fletcher School of Law and Di-
plomacy, Tufts University. In June 2000, Mr. Reed was appointed chairman of the
newly established United States Court of International Trade Advisory Committee
on Jurisdiction. The views expressed in this article are those of the author (and
CITBA, for Parts II and III) and do not necessarily represent those of the Adviso-
ry Committee.
1. Readers are also referred to the explanation and summary of the CITBA
proposals by Sidney N. Weiss, in 1994, at the Ninth USCIT Judicial Conference.
See 161 F.R.D. 547, 590-92 (1994). Mr. Weiss was elected president of CITBA in
2000. Several of the ideas in this article also are discussed in PATRICK C. REED,
THE ROLE OF FEDERAL COURTS IN U.S. CusToMs & INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
359-66 (1997).
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This article presents the texts of the two CITBA reports
(with added footnotes and minor editorial changes), together
with the author's comments on the CITBA proposals prepared
for the 1999 Judicial Conference. Part II of this article pres-
ents CITBA's first report, which identified several areas in
which the CIT's lack of jurisdiction seems anomalous or illogi-
cal. Part III of this article presents CITBA's second report,
which originally was issued shortly after the completion of the
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations and which
identified areas of judicial review related to the Uruguay
Round Agreements that are, or potentially should be, assigned
to the CIT. The author's comments are found in Part IV of the
article.
II. CORRECTION OF JURISDICTIONAL ANOMALIES AND
LIMITATIONS
2
A. Forfeiture Cases Arising from Customs Seizures
The CIT should be given in rem jurisdiction to hear forfei-
ture cases arising from the Customs Service's seizure of goods.
This heading is intended to encompass all civil seizures made
by the Customs Service. It includes, without limitation; sei-
zures predicated on failure to declare;3 fraudulent omissions
from invoice or entry;4 counterfeit trademarks;' importations
involving fraud, gross negligence or negligence;6 introduction
of merchandise contrary to law;' currency violations;8 and ex-
port violations.' Presently, these cases are within the jurisdic-
2. Part II is a slightly edited version of CITBA's June 1994 report entitled
"Recommended Expansions in the Jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of International
Trade." The report also noted that the CIT's jurisdiction had been expanded in
certain respects in the North American Free Trade Implementation Act, Pub. L.
No. 103-82, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19
U.S.C.).
3. See 19 U.S.C. § 1497 (1999).
4. See id. § 1499.
5. See id. § 1526.
6. See id. § 1592(c)(5)-(6) (authorizing seizure in specified circumstances).
7. See id. § 1595a(c) (specifying the categories of merchandise that may be
seized).
8. See 31 U.S.C. § 5317 (1983 & Supp. 2000).
9. See 22 U.S.C. § 401 (1991); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(g) (1991). The list of
statutes is not intended to be exhaustive. For example, the Customs Service some-
times has seized merchandise under the civil forfeiture authority set forth in 18
U.S.C. app. § 981 (2000) or other provisions of Title 18. It completely would defeat
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tion of district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1355.10 These cases
are logically within the CIT's area of responsibility because
they involve government action affecting imported goods and
often raise issues closely related to typical customs issues
currently heard by the CIT.
Moreover, in some instances, the existing jurisdictional
allocation appears to be particularly anomalous because a case
may begin as an "exclusion" or "request for redelivery," which
is reviewable by the CIT, and turn into a "seizure," which is
reviewable in a district court.1 Although the statute authoriz-
ing seizure of merchandise imported "contrary to law" was
amended in 199312 to clarify and limit the categories of mer-
chandise that may be seized, it appears that the procedural
setting of a case still can change from an administrative ac-
tion, reviewable in the CIT, to a seizure case, adjudicated in a
district court.
B. Lawsuits by Importers Contesting Certain Non-Protestable,
Penalty-Type Actions
The CIT should be given jurisdiction over lawsuits by
importers contesting government actions in penalty and liqui-
dated damage cases which have been held to be non-protest-
able and outside the jurisdiction of the CIT. For example, in
Trayco, Inc. v. United States,3 the Federal Circuit held that a
lawsuit by an importer contesting the legality of imposing a
mitigated penalty was within the jurisdiction of the district
court under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2).'4 This result is anomalous
the purpose of the proposed jurisdictional expansion if the Customs Service could
oust the CIT of jurisdiction by invoking a non-enumerated provision, such as §
981, in support of a seizure of imported merchandise. The authority under § 981
is not limited to seizures by the Customs Service. However, while it is recom-
mended that the CIT should have jurisdiction in all civil seizures by the Customs
Service, this proposal is not intended to give the CIT jurisdiction over non-customs
seizures. It should be recognized that a degree of uncertainty in the jurisdictional
allocation seems almost inevitable if the responsibility for judicial review under a
particular statutory provision is divided between the CIT and district courts.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1355 (1993).
11. See, e.g., R.J.F. Fabrics, Inc. v. United States, 10 Ct. Int'l Trade 735, 651
F. Supp. 1431 (1986).
12. NAFTA Implementation Act, tit. VI, § 624, 107 Stat. 2057, 2187 (1993)
(amending 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c) (1999)).
13. 994 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
14. See id. at 837. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1993) (giving the district
2001]
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because lawsuits by the government to enforce penalties are
within the CIT's jurisdiction under section 1582,15 and the
allocation of subject-matter jurisdiction among the courts logi-
cally should not depend on which party the plaintiff is.
C. Import Restrictions and Prohibitions Involving "Non-
Customs" Issues
The CIT should be given expanded jurisdiction in civil
actions against the United States to contest administrative
actions which affect commercial import transactions by prohib-
iting or restricting the importation of particular kinds of mer-
chandise, but which do not involve traditional customs law is-
sues.
The existing statutes do not make it clear that the CIT
should be the proper forum for reviewing administrative ac-
tions of this kind. Specifically, this proposal is intended to
address an ambiguity in the statute identified in K Mart Corp.
v. Cartier, Inc.6 In that case, the Supreme Court held that a
lawsuit contesting the Customs Service's interpretation of the
statutory prohibition on the importation of certain grey-market
goods was within the jurisdiction of the district court. 7 A key
court concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Federal Claims where the claim
does not exceed $10,000). The jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims is based
on 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (1994 & Supp. 2000) and has no limit on the amount in
controversy. Consistent with Trayco is Miami Free Zone Corp. v. United States, 17
Ct. Int'l Trade 687, 826 F. Supp. 526 (1993) (dismissing similar lawsuit for lack of
jurisdiction in the CIT). A similar jurisdictional confusion is illustrated by Com-
modities Exp. Co. v. United States, 888 F.2d 431, 435-46 (6th Cir. 1989), in which
the Sixth Circuit remanded for further consideration the question of whether a
lawsuit seeking to enjoin assessment of liquidated damages for alleged violations
by a duty-free store was within the jurisdiction of the CIT or the district court. At
a later stage in the same dispute, the Federal Circuit in United States u. Com-
modities Exp. Co., 972 F.2d 1266, 1270-72 (Fed. Cir. 1992), ruled that the CIT had
jurisdiction, in an action by the government, to enforce payment of the liquidated
damages. Furthermore, in the Carlingswitch litigation of the early 1980s, the CIT
was held to lack jurisdiction in an action contesting the refusal to refund a volun-
tary tender of duties in a penalty case; arguably the plaintiff could have sued in
the Claims Court. See Carlingswitch, Inc. v. United States, 5 Ct. Int'l Trade 70,
560 F. Supp. 46, affd per curiam, 720 F.2d 656 (1983); Carlingswitch, Inc. v.
United States, 85 Cust. Ct. 63, 500 F. Supp. 223 (1980), affd, 68 C.C.P.A. 49,
C.A.D. 1264, 651 F.2d 768 (1981). See also infra notes 98-99 and accompanying
text (discussing further developments in this area).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1582 (1994).
16. 485 U.S. 176 (1988).
17. See id. at 182-83.
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basis for the Court's decision was that 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(3)"5
gives the CIT jurisdiction in cases arising from "embargoes"
and "quantitative restrictions," but not "import prohibi-
tions."9 Thus, section 1581(i)(3) should be amended to include
"import prohibitions" in addition to "embargoes" and "quantita-
tive restrictions."
With such an amendment, a principal type of case to be
heard in the CIT would be administrative decisions on trade-
related intellectual property issues, such as the agency action
underlying the K Mart case. Giving the CIT jurisdiction in
such cases is particularly appropriate because the Customs
Service exercises independent decision-making authority on
trade-related intellectual property matters" and, in general,
lawsuits contesting Customs Service actions already are heard
in the CIT.
In addition, this proposal would expand and clarify the
CIT's jurisdiction to conduct judicial review in lawsuits to
contest actions by administrative agencies, other than the
Customs Service, which affect commercial import transactions.
Some administrative actions of this type already are reviewed
in the CIT, but, again, the existing statutes are unclear, and
time-consuming litigation has been required to resolve jurisdic-
tional issues.2 ' This proposed jurisdictional grant is intended
to include review of import-related actions taken by such agen-
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(3) (1994).
19. K Mart Corp., 485 U.S. at 189. Presently, some lawsuits contesting "im-
port prohibitions" might be heard in the CIT, based on § 1581(a) jurisdiction, in a
lawsuit contesting the denial of a "protest" filed under 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (1999
& Supp. 2000). This is because a protest may include a challenge to "the legality
of all orders and decisions entering into" the Customs Service's decision, and the
"exclusion" of goods from entry is among the decisions that may be challenged in
a protest. Thus, present law seems anomalous in that the CIT can review import
prohibitions if they constitute "orders and decisions entering into" a protestable
exclusion by the Customs Service. However, K Mart holds that the CIT does not
have jurisdiction to review "import prohibitions" under § 1581(i). The inconsistency
is intensified because present law generally allows the CIT to invoke its residual
jurisdiction under § 1581(i) if the protest remedy is manifestly inadequate.
20. See 28 U.S.C. § 1582 (1994).
21. In Conoco, Inc. v. U.S. Foreign-Trade Zones Bd., 18 F.3d 1581, 1590 (Fed.
Cir. 1994), the CAFC, reversing the CIT, held that the CIT has jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) to review decisions by the Foreign-Trade Zones Board. The
decision illustrates the uncertainty in current law, although it ultimately confirms
that the CIT is the proper forum to conduct judicial review of regulatory measures
which affect imports; even if the contested action is taken by an agency other
than the Customs Service.
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cies as the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") (for exam-
ple, "import alerts" prohibiting the importation of specified
goods), the Department of Agriculture, the Federal Communi-
cations Commission ("FCC"), the Consumer Products Safety
Commission ("CPSC"), and the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA"). Giving the CIT jurisdiction in these cases is
logical because, like the cases currently heard in the CIT, they
involve government regulatory actions which directly affect
imported goods and commercial import transactions.
D. Export-Control Cases
The CIT should be given jurisdiction in lawsuits seeking
judicial review under the Export Administration Act
("EAA').22 In addition to the export-related seizures discussed
in Part A, the EAA affords limited rights of judicial review on
certain procedural issues,23 the imposition of sanctions,24 and
denial of export privilegesY Presently, the § 2409(j) cases are
heard in district courts and the § 2412 cases are heard in the
D.C. Circuit. It would be logical to give* the CIT jurisdiction
because these lawsuits challenge government actions affecting
international trade in goods.
E. Direct Right of Action in Anti-Dumping, Countervailing
Duty, and Penalty Cases
The CIT should be given jurisdiction in cases based on a
direct right of action for unfair trade practices (if it is deemed
appropriate to provide direct rights of action in such cases, a
question on which this article takes no position). Presently,
such a right of action still is available under the Anti-Dumping
Act of 1916.26 In addition, at various times, bills have been
introduced to create a new private right of action in anti-
dumping, countervailing duty, and penalty cases.27 It would
be logical to give the CIT jurisdiction in such cases because (a)
22. Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-20 (1991
& Supp. 2000).
23. See id. app. § 2409G).
24. See id. § 2412(c).
25. See id. § 2412(d)-(e) (denial of an export license is not subject to judicial
review).
26. Anti-Dumping Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 71-77 (1999).
27. See, e.g., REED, supra note 1, at 359.
[Vol. XXVI:3824
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the substantive laws are closely related to those presently
heard in the CIT and (b) the cases would make use of the
CIT's experience as a trial court.28
F. Expanded Review of Customs Prospective Rulings
The CIT should be given expanded jurisdiction to review
prospective customs rulings. Presently, under 28 U.S.C. §
1581(h),29 the CIT has jurisdiction to review prospective rul-
ings, but only if the plaintiff establishes that it "would be ir-
reparably harmed unless given an opportunity to obtain judi-
cial review prior to importation." The "irreparably harmed"
standard has been very difficult, if not virtually impossible, for
plaintiffs to satisfy." It appears that the CIT has exercised
jurisdiction under section 1581(h) on only a few occasions.3
28. At least one version of the bill to create a private right of action in
dumping, countervailing, and penalty cases vested jurisdiction concurrently in the
CIT and the District Court for the District of Columbia. If concurrent trial-level
jurisdiction is created, it is suggested that appeals in these cases from both the
CIT and the D.C. District Court should go to the Federal Circuit; thereby promot-
ing greater uniformity in the law. See id. at 360.
29. "The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any
civil action commenced to review, prior to the importation of the goods involved, a
ruling issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, or a refusal to issue or change
such a ruling, relating to classification, valuation, rate of duty, marking, restricted
merchandise, entry requirements, drawbacks, vessel repairs, or similar matters, but
only if the party commencing the civil action demonstrates to the court that he
would be irreparably harmed unless given an opportunity to obtain judicial review
prior to such importation." 28 U.S.C. § 1581(h) (1994).
30. See, e.g., Thyssen Steel Co. v. United States, 13 Ct. Int'l Trade 323, 712
F. Supp. 202, 204-06 (1989) (holding that irreparable harm was not shown where
the importer could have adjusted its business operations to anticipate an adverse
ruling, but did not do so).
31. See, e.g., Ross Cosmetics Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. v. United States, 17 Ct. Int'l
Trade 966, 15 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2050, 2050-51 (1993). The Ross court's opinion did
not explain why the jurisdictional requirements were satisfied, and jurisdiction
apparently was not contested. The case challenged a ruling on the issue of wheth-
er certain labels and packaging constituted a counterfeit use of trademarks. Since
the goods would have been subject to seizure if imported, this fact may have been
the basis for satisfying the required irreparable injury. See also National Juice
Prod. Ass'n v. United States, 10 Ct. Int'l Trade 48, 628 F. Supp. 978, 984-87
(1986) (irreparable harm shown where detention of imported supplies would result
in significant disruption of business operations, and complying with ruling would
require millions of dollars of unrecoverable expenditures). The most recent case in
which the CIT assumed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(h) is Heartland By-
Products, Inc. v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1999) (assum-,
ing jurisdiction based on showing that the contested ruling would force the plain-
tiff to close its business imminently), reh'g denied, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1339 (Ct. Int'l
BROOK. J. INTL L.
Because the availability of section 1581(h) in practical
terms is so limited, consideration should be given to adopting a
lower threshold than "irreparably harmed." For example, al-
lowing judicial review where it would be "commercially imprac-
ticable" to await importation might be workable. 2
G. -New Areas of Judicial Review under International Trade
Agreements
The CIT should be given jurisdiction over any new areas of
judicial review in international trade that may be created
under international trade agreements to which the United
States is a party. In 1993, this idea was followed in the
NAFTA Implementation Act to incorporate the new advance
rulings on origin issues into existing Customs Service proce-
dures (protests and domestic-interested-party petitions) which
are subject to judicial review in the CIT. Although apparently
no other analogous new areas of judicial review have been
proposed, the CIT remains the logical forum for this type of
case. This idea is developed further in Part III of this article.
III. JURISDICTION RELATED TO THE URUGUAY ROUND
AGREEMENTS
33
This part summarizes the provisions in the agreements
comprising the Final Act of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations,' which require members to provide judi-
cial review of administrative determinations affecting interna-
tional trade, and recommends several expansions in the juris-
diction of the U.S. CIT to implement new rights of judicial
review resulting from the Uruguay Round agreements.35
Trade 2000), appeal docketed, App. No. 00-1287 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
32. This standard was considered in 1980, but it ultimately was not adopted.
33. This part is a slightly edited version of CITBA's July 1994 report entitled
"Recommended New Areas of USCIT Jurisdiction Resulting From The Uruguay
Round Agreements."
34. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), 'available at http:J/www.wto.orgleng-
lish/docs._e/legal.e/final_e.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2001).
35. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement], available at http:J/www.wto.org/
english/docs.e/legaLe/fnal-e.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2001).
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Part A, below, identifies several instances in which the
CIT already has jurisdiction to conduct judicial review as re-
quired by a Uruguay Round Agreement. 6 The Uruguay
Round Agreements discussed in this part of the report (such as
GATT 1994,"7 the Agreement on Anti-Dumping Measures, 8
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 9
and the Agreement on Customs Valuation 0 ) cover areas in
which the CIT already has extensive experience, and most of
these agreements are new versions of earlier GATT Agree-
ments.
Part B, below, identifies new areas of judicial review of
administrative actions affecting international trade under the
Uruguay Round Agreements. As explained below, these agree-
ments bring a number of matters under the umbrella of the
WTO, which oversees the operation of Uruguay Round Agree-
ments. By virtue of the CIT's experience in areas covered by
the earlier GATT Agreements, it is recommended that wherev-
er a new cause of action for judicial review is created as a
result of the Uruguay Round Agreements, jurisdiction to con-
duct the judicial review should be assigned to the CIT.
With respect to some of the recommended expansions of
CIT jurisdiction, current law provides that the CIT would have
36. See id. at art. XVI, available at http://www.wto.orglenglish/docs.ellegal-el
final_e.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2001).
37. The original text of the GATT is found at General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinaf-
ter GATT 19471. On Apr. 15, 1994, GATT 1947, as amended, was incorporated
into the WTO as GATT 1994 in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement [hereinafter
GATT 19941, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal e/finale.htm (last
visited Jan. 10, 2001).
38. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex A, LEGAL INSTRU-
MENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 153 (1994) [hereinafter
Anti-Dumping Measures], available at http://www.wto.orgenglish/docs e/legal el
finaLe.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2001).
39. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol.
1, 33 I.L.M. 229 (1994) [hereinafter Subsidies and Countervailing Measures], avail-
able at httpJ/www.wto.orglenglisldocse/lega e/final-e.htm (last visited Jan. 10,
2001).
40. Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRU-
MENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 171 (1994) [hereinafter
Customs Valuation], available at http://www.wto.orglenglishdocs-e/lega e/fl-
nal-e.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2001).
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jurisdiction to review an administrative decision in some proce-
dural contexts (for example, a decision forming the basis for a
protestable exclusion or request for redelivery of imported
goods), but the CIT would not have jurisdiction in other proce-
dural contexts. This article recommends that the allocation of
subject matter jurisdiction not depend on the procedural con-
text in which the decision is made. Rather, the law should be
clarified to provide the CIT with jurisdiction regardless of the
procedural context.
A. Existing Areas of CIT Jurisdiction under the Uruguay
Round Agreements
1. GATT 1994
GATT provides that "each contracting party shall main-
tain.., judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or proce-
dures for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review and
correction of administrative action relating to customs matters.
Such tribunals or procedures shall be independent of the agen-
cies entrusted with administrative enforcement... .""' This
right of judicial review already exists in U.S. law. The CIT has
jurisdiction, principally under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a).
2. Agreement on Anti-Dumping Measures
Article 13 of the Agreement on Anti-Dumping Measures
requires that
[elach Member whose national legislation contains provisions
on anti-dumping measures shall maintain judicial, arbitral or
administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter
alia, of the prompt review of administrative actions relating
to final determinations and reviews of determinations ....
Such tribunals or procedures shall be independent of the
authorities responsible for the determination or review in
question.42
This right of judicial review already exists in U.S. law, and the
CIT has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c).
41. GATT 1994, supra note 37, at art. X, para. 3(b).
42. Anti-Dumping Measures, supra note 38, at art. 13.
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3. Agreement on Customs Valuation
Article 11, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Agreement on Cus-
toms Valuation provide that
[t]he legislation of each Member shall provide in regard to a
determination of customs value for the right of appeal, with-
out penalty, by the importer or any other person liable for
the payment of duty. An initial right of appeal without penal-
ty may be made to an authority within the customs adminis-
tration or to an independent body, but the legislation of each
Member shall provide for the right of appeal without penalty
to a judicial authority.43
This provision appears to be a specific application of the gener-
al right of judicial review under GATT article X, paragraph
3(b)." The right of judicial review already exists in the United
States, and the CIT has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a).
4. Agreement on Rules of Origin
Article 2(j) of the Agreement on Rules of Origin" requires
members, during the transition period before harmonized rules
of origin are adopted, to ensure that "any administrative action
which they take in relation to the determination of origin is re-
viewable promptly by judicial, arbitral, or administrative tribu-
nals or procedures, independent of the authority issuing the
determination, which can effect the modification or reversal 'of
the determination." 6 Article 3(h) contains the same require-
ment after the transition period.47 Although the Agreement on
Rules of Origin is new, the provision for judicial review ap-
pears to be another specific application of GATT article X,
paragraph 3(b). The right of judicial review already exists in
U.S. law. The CIT has jurisdiction, principally under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(a).
43. Customs Valuation, supra note 40, at art. 11, paras. 1-2.
44. GATT 1994, supra note 37, at art. X, para. 3(b).
45. Agreement on Rules of Origin, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M.
209 (1994) [hereinafter Rules of Origin], available at http'//www.wto.orglenglish/
docs_eflegaLelflnal e.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2001).
46. Id. at art. 2(0).
47. Id. at art. 3(h).
2001] 829
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5. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Article 23 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervail-
ing Measures requires that
[e]ach Member whose national legislation contains provisions
on countervailing duty measures shall maintain judicial,
arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for the
purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review of administrative
actions relating to final determinations and reviews of deter-
minations... Such tribunals or procedures shall be inde-
pendent of the authorities responsible for the determination
or review in question .... "'
This right of judicial review already exists in U.S. law, with
the CIT having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c).
6. Agreement on Safeguards
The Agreement on Safeguards (i.e., escape clause mea-
sures) does not provide expressly for judicial review.49 Rather,
it provides for "an investigation by the competent authori-
ties," o whose "determination... shall be made.., on the
basis of objective evidence. . . ."" In current U.S. law, escape
clause determinations are reviewable in the CIT, with jurisdic-
tion based on 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). However, the scope of review
is extremely narrow because of the broad discretion accorded to
the President under the statute.52 The newly formed Safe-
guards Agreement may create increased interest in escape
clause proceedings; particularly since the agreement prohibits
"voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements
or any other similar measures on the export or the import
side."53 If Congress chooses to provide a less discretion-orient
48. Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 39, at art. 23.
49. Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 283
(1994) [hereinafter Safeguards], available at http//www.wto.orgenglish/docse/le-
gal_e/final e.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2001).
50. Id. at art. 3, para. 1.
51. Id. at art. 4, para. 2(b).
52. See, e.g., Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States, 762 F.2d 86, 89 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
53. Safeguards, supra note 49, at art. 11, para. 1(b).
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ed administrative procedure, a broader right of judicial review
in the CIT would be appropriate.
B. Recommended New Areas of USCIT Jurisdiction Resulting
from the Uruguay Round Agreements
1. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
Article 5.2.8 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade54 provides that members, where conformity with techni-
cal regulations or standards is required, must ensure that "a
procedure exists to review complaints concerning the operation
of a conformity assessment procedure and to take corrective
action when a complaint is justified."55
This provision does not expressly require judicial review,
but could be satisfied by providing for judicial review. In some
instances affecting imported goods, the enforcement of a tech-
nical standard could result in a protestable exclusion or re-
quest for redelivery of goods. In these instances, the CIT might
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) to review the deni-
al of the protest. In addition, the CIT might have jurisdiction
to review some technical standards under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).
However, a number of technical barriers to trade apparently
are excluded from section 1581(i) jurisdiction because they
would constitute measures for the protection of the public
health or safety. If the CIT does not have jurisdiction, the
technical standard can be presumed to be subject to judicial
review by virtue of the general presumption of reviewability in
U.S. law, the Administrative Procedure Act, 6 and district
courts' federal question jurisdiction.57
Thus, the CIT currently has jurisdiction to review techni-
cal barriers to trade in some cases, depending on the procedur-
al context. But in other cases, either the CIT lacks jurisdiction
or the jurisdictional allocation is unclear. Since administrative
decisions concerning technical barriers to trade are now under
54. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agree-
ment, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 117 (1994) [hereinafter Technical Barriers to Trade], available at
http'J/www.wto.org/englishtdocs._e/legal_e/final e.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2001).
55. Id. at art. 5.2.8.
56. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1996).
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
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the WTO umbrella, it would be logical to amend the statute to
make it clear that the CIT has jurisdiction to review all admin-
istrative decisions applying a technical standard to imported
goods.
2. Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
Annex C, paragraph 1(i) of the Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures" requires members to ensure that "a
procedure exists to review complaints concerning the operation
of... procedures [to check and ensure the fulfillment of sani-
tary and phytosanitary measures] and to take corrective action
when a complaint is justified."59 This requirement closely par-
allels the requirement in the Agreement on Technical Barriers
to Trade,"0 and generally the same comments apply. It ap-
pears that virtually all sanitary and phytosanitary measures
currently are excluded from the CIT's section 1581(i) jurisdic-
tion because they relate to the public health or safety, al-
though the CIT could review the same sanitary or
phytosanitary measure if its application resulted in a protest-
able exclusion of imported goods.6 '
3. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS)"
Article 41, paragraph 4 of TRIPS provides that "[p]arties
to a proceeding shall have an opportunity for review by a judi-
cial authority of final administrative decisions .... 63 This
provision encompasses Article 51 (Border Measures) which
authorizes, among other actions, the suspension of release
58. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 69 (1994) [hereinafter Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures], available at http:J/www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legale/
final-e.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2001).
59. Id. Annex C, para. I(i).
60. Technical Barriers to Trade, supra note 54.
61. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1994).
62. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URU-
GUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/final_e.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2001).
63. Id. at art. 41, para. 4.
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from customs custody of allegedly infringing goods." Similar-
ly, article 59 provides that "subject to the right of... review
by a judicial authority, competent authorities shall have the
authority to order the destruction or disposal of infringing
goods ....
Current U.S. law generally provides for judicial review of
administrative actions in the intellectual property area. CITBA
previously has recommended that the jurisdictional statutes
should be amended to make it clear that the CIT has jurisdic-
tion with respect to trade-related intellectual property matters.
Currently, exclusions of infringing goods are reviewable by
protest in the CIT, but seizures and intellectual-property-relat-
ed "import prohibitions" are reviewable in district courts. The
inclusion of TRIPS within the WTO umbrella reinforces the
logic of CITBA's earlier recommendation that the CIT should
have expanded jurisdiction in this area.
In addition to the foregoing, Article 42 of the TRIPS agree-
ment provides that "[m]embers shall make available to rights
holders civil judicial procedures concerning the enforcement of
any intellectual property right covered by this Agreement."66
This provision requires the availability of a private cause of
action not involving judicial review of agency action. It is sug-
gested that lawsuits of this kind logically should remain in
district courts.
4. Agreement on Government Procurement
Article XX, paragraph 2 of the Agreement on Government
Procurement 7 requires each party to "provide non-discrimina-
tory, timely, transparent and effective procedures enabling
suppliers to challenge alleged breaches of the Agreement aris-
ing in the context of procurements in which they have, or have
had, an interest."" Under paragraph 6, "challenges shall be
heard by a court or by an impartial and independent review
64. See id. at art. 51.
65. Id. at art. 59.
66. Id. at art. 42.
67. Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMIENT-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31 (1994),
available at http-//www.wto.orglenglish/docs-ellegaLe/final-e.htm (last visited Jan.
10, 2001).
68. Id. at art. XX, para. 2.
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body with no interest in the outcome of the procurement and
the members of which are secure from external influence dur-
ing the term of appointment."69 Paragraph 6 also provides
that a "review body which is not a court shall either be subject
to judicial review or shall have [specified quasi-judicial] proce-
dures .... 70
The challenge procedure is a new requirement under the
Government Procurement Agreement. Although equivalents to
judicial review are permitted, in the context of U.S. law, the
most logical option would be to provide for judicial review. It is
recommended that this new cause of action should be assigned
to the CIT, particularly since the CIT already has jurisdiction
in government procurement under the limited and rarely used
jurisdictional grant in 28 U.S.C. § 1581(e), relating to origin
determinations for purposes of procurement.
5. General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
Article VI, paragraph 2(a) of GATS provides that
[elach Member shall maintain or institute as soon as practi-
cable judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or proce-
dures which provide, at the request of an affected service
supplier, for the prompt review of, and where justified, appro-
priate remedies for, administrative decisions affecting trade
in services. Where such procedures are not independent of
the agency entrusted with the administrative decision con-
cerned, the Member shall ensure that they do in fact provide
for an objective and impartial review."'
Current U.S. law might satisfy this obligation since judi-
cial review probably is available under the Administrative
Procedure Act, the presumption of reviewability, and district
courts' federal question jurisdiction. Since trade in services has
been brought under the WTO umbrella, it is recommended that
an express cause of action to review alleged violations of the
GATS should be created. The CIT should be allocated jurisdic-
69. Id. at para. 6.
70. Id.
71. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex 1B, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY RoUND vol. 31 (1994),
33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994), available at http'/www.wto.orgenglish/docs-e/legal-e/fi-
nal-e.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2001).
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tion over administrative determinations involving trade in
services which relate to the provision of services across borders
and to the implementation of U.S. obligations under the GATS.
This step would move the CIT's jurisdiction into a new area,
since until now it has dealt only with trade in goods.
6. Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing does not express-
ly provide for judicial review, but it is implied by several provi-
sions.
Article 5(1) requires members to "establish the necessary
legal provisions and/or administrative procedures to take ac-
tion against... circumvention." 2 These procedures could in-
clude judicial review. Current U.S. law treats circumvention
under the customs penalty statutes, and the CIT would have
jurisdiction under section 1582. In addition, as CITBA previ-
ously has recommended, the CIT also should be given jurisdic-
tion in customs seizures and in importer-initiated lawsuits
arising from penalty proceedings.
Article 6 provides for a "transitional safeguard mecha-
nism,"" which is similar to, but separate from, general safe-
guards proceedings discussed above. Again, if Congress chooses
to provide a less discretion-oriented administrative procedure
than currently exists, it would be appropriate to assign judicial
review to the CIT.
Article 7 incorporates by reference "GATT 1994 rules and
disciplines" 4 in several areas, including "facilitation of cus-
toms ... formalities."75 Arguably, this provision encompasses
the requirement of judicial review in customs matters under
GATT article X(3)(b).7'
72. Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, art.
5.1, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31 (1994),
available at http'//www.wto.org/englishtdocs-e/legal-e/final-e.htm (last visited Jan.
10, 2001).
73. Id. at art. 6.
74. Id. at art. 7.
75. Id.
76. GATT 1994, supra note 37, art. 10, para. 3(b).
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7. Agreement on Agriculture
Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture creates a Special
Safeguards Procedure ("SSP") for certain agricultural prod-
ucts.7" The SSP differs from the usual safeguards procedure
in that the imposition of additional duties can occur automati-
cally if imports reach specified "trigger levels" in volume or
specified "trigger prices." 8 Since the import relief is intended
to be automatic, the Agreement could warrant enactment of a
right of judicial review in the nature of mandamus if the speci-
fied conditions are met but additional duties are not imposed.
Judicial review also is warranted if additional duties are im-
posed, to determine whether the specified conditions existed.
Jurisdiction to conduct judicial review in such cases should be
assigned to the CIT because the administrative inaction would
relate to import duties.
8. Judicial Review in Section 301 Cases (Encompassing
Several Uruguay Round Agreements)
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, requires
the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR") to initi-
ate an investigation where the contested foreign action or prac-
tice constitutes a violation of an international trade agree-
ment. 9 Currently, it appears that a party filing a section 301
petition does not have a cause of action for judicial review if
the USTR does not initiate the requested investigation. But,
where the statute makes an investigation mandatory (i.e., for
violations of an international trade agreement)," consider-
ation should be given to providing for judicial review to deter-
mine whether the USTR has failed to initiate in circumstances
in which initiation is mandatory. In addition, consideration
should be given to providing for judicial review of the factual
and legal conclusions underlying a determination by the USTR
(for example, factual and legal conclusions concerning whether
77. Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, art. 5.1, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31 (1994) [hereinafter Agri-
culture], available at http://www.wto.org/englisb/docs-e/legaLe/fmiaLe.htm (last visit-
ed Jan. 10, 2001).
78. Id.





a particular foreign program is prohibited a subsidy). However,
this recommendation would not encompass judicial review of
discretionary elements in the USTR's action, stich as the ap-
propriate remedial action to be taken.
Because of its experience involving international trade
agreements, the CIT would be the logical forum to exercise
jurisdiction in such cases.
The cause of action would apply to violations of many, if
not all, of the Uruguay Round Agreements. Among the most
important potential violations would be a subsidy prohibited by
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,"1 a
trade-related investment requirement inconsistent with the
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, 2 domes-
tic support measures for agricultural products failing to qualify
as exempt from trade remedies because they do not conform
fully to the provisions of that agreement,3 and failure to im-
plement the requirements of the TRIPS agreement for domes-
tic protection of intellectual property rights.'4
9. Trade-Related Freedom-of-Information Judicial Review
(Encompassing Several Uruguay Round Agreements)
Many of the Uruguay Round Agreements require members
to notify all other members, through the WTO Secretariat, of
the member's laws and regulations affecting international
trade."5
The private bar has a keen interest in having such docu-
mentation freely obtainable on behalf of its clients. Consider-
ation should be given to the establishment of a special proce-
dure, in the nature of a Freedom of Information Act request,
that would allow a private party to request an appropriate
U.S. agency (such as the Commerce Department or USTR) to
provide copies of documents containing reports to the WTO by
81. Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 39, at art. 3.
82. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, art. 2 & Annex, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 1 (1994) [hereinafter TRIMS], available at http://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/docs e/legaLe/final_e.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2001).
83. See Agriculture, supra note 77, at art. 13.
84. TRIPS, supra note 62.
85. See, e.g., Technical Barriers to Trade, supra note 54, at art. 5.6.2; TRIMS,
supra note 82, at art. 5; Rules of Origin, supra note 45, at art. 5.1; Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, supra note 39, at art. 25.
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foreign countries on their measures regulating international
trade. To the extent such a procedure is created, denials of
such requests should be subject to judicial review, and the CIT
should exercise jurisdiction because of its experience involving
international trade agreements.
10. Agreement on Import Licensing
The Agreement on Import Licensing provides that "[t]he
rules for import licensing procedures shall be neutral in. appli-
cation and administered in a fair and equitable manner." "
Although this obligation does not expressly require judicial
review, the availability of judicial review would help to assure
its fulfillment. To the extent U.S. law provides for import li-
censes or analogous measures, the administrative determina-
tion should be subject to judicial review in the CIT.
IV. COMMENTS ON THE CITBA PROPOSALS
The guiding principle behind CITBA's recommendations in
Parts II and III was to continue the role for the CIT envisaged
in the Customs Courts Act of 1980."7 Namely, to have a com-
prehensive system of judicial review of agency actions under
the federal customs and international trade laws in a court
with specialized expertise and jurisdiction-the CIT.8" The sys-
tem of judicial review under federal laws that regulated and
taxed imports of merchandise into the United States was
transformed between 1970 and 1980.89 Until 1970, that sys-
tem was limited to the Customs Court's judicial review in
customs and tariff cases. By 1980, the role of the judiciary was
transformed and the CIT came to exercise judicial review un-
86. Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agree-
ment, LEGAL INsTREUiENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31 (1994), avail-
able at http://www.wto.orglenglisb/docs-ellegal-e/finaLe.htm (last visited Jan. 10,
2001).
87. Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980) (codified principally in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C., notably including 28 U.S.C. §§ 251-57, 1581-85, and 2631-
46).
88. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1235, at 20 (1980) ("a comprehensive system of civil
actions arising from import transactions, utilizing the specialized expertise of the
United States Customs Court and the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals."). See also S. REP. NO. 96-466, at 3 (1979) ("a comprehensive system of
judicial review of civil actions arising from import transactions").
89. See REED, supra note 1, at 125-77.
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der a mixed system of import regulation consisting of customs
and tariff laws, anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws,
and other international trade laws.
As the culmination of this process, the 1980 Act
(i) transferred jurisdiction for judicial review under several
[customs and international trade] laws from the district
courts to the CIT, (ii) attempted to resolve the inadequate
jurisdictional demarcation between district courts and the
former Customs Court, and (iii) gave the CIT the same full
powers in law and equity as district courts exercised."
These purposes of the 1980 Act also should be understood in
connection with steps previously taken in the Customs Proce-
dural Reform and Simplification Act of 1978,9' which trans-
ferred jurisdiction in customs penalty cases under section 592
of the Tariff Act92 from district courts to the Customs Court,
and the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,9' which made judicial
review in the CIT (at the time, still called the Customs Court)
an integral part of the procedures under the newly amended
anti-dumping and countervailing duty statute.
CITBA's reports, published as Parts II and III of this arti-
cle, addressed two general subjects. The first CITBA report
identified several areas in which it appeared, with hindsight,
that the goals of the 1980 Act had not been fully achieved.94
There still were certain areas of law in which the demarcation
between the jurisdiction of district courts and the jurisdiction
of the CIT was not set forth with sufficient clarity. Further,
there appeared to be certain areas of law which, although
assigned to district courts, appeared more logically to be relat-
ed to the matters heard by the CIT. As a result, the existing
allocation of jurisdiction appeared to fall short of the goal of
giving the CIT "comprehensive" jurisdiction in cases arising
from international trade transactions.
90. Id. at 177.
91. Pub. L. No. 95-410, § 110, 92 Stat. 888, 896 (1978) (amending Tariff Act
of 1930, § 592(e), 19 U.S.C. § 1592(e) (1994)).
92. 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (1994).
93. Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 1001, 93 Stat. 144, 300-306 (1979) (adding Tariff Act
of 1930, § 516A, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1994)).
94. See supra Part II.
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The proposals in the second CITBA report develop the idea
of giving the CIT jurisdiction in new areas of judicial review
created under the international trade agreements adopted in
the Uruguay Round." These proposals parallel the expansion
of the jurisdiction of the CIT in accordance with the shift in
the system of U.S. import laws away from a system based
almost entirely on customs laws and toward a mixed system
consisting of customs laws, anti-dumping and countervailing
duty laws, and other international trade laws. The Uruguay
Round agreements expanded the scope of the international
trade regime administered by the WTO. Several of the new
WTO Agreements include provisions requiring or allowing
procedures for judicial review under the internal laws of WTO
members. Consistent with the goal of having a "comprehen-
sive" system of judicial review in matters relating to interna-
tional trade, CITBA recommended that new causes of action
under the WTO Agreements logically should be assigned to the
CIT.9
6
An amplification of Part II is warranted under the heading
of "certain non-protestable penalty-type actions."97 The report
focused in particular on the jurisdictional confusion resulting
from the Trayco decision, in which an importer was allowed to
bring a lawsuit in district court contesting the imposition of a
customs penalty." In retrospect, Trayco apparently has not
been followed by similar lawsuits presenting the same jurisdic-
tional anomaly. Consequently, perhaps Trayco does not repre-
sent as serious a jurisdictional problem as had been thought
when CITBA's report was drafted. Nevertheless, even without
a reappearance of the specific issue in Trayco, the -CIT ac-
knowledges that there remains a "very unsettled legal land-
scape with regard to jurisdiction over suits by importers to
"99
recover or avoid Customs duties or penalties ....
95. See supra Part III.
96. See id.
97. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
98. Trayco, Inc. v. United States, 994 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1993). See supra
note 13 and accompanying text.
99. Bridalane Fashions, Inc. v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 2d 466 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1998) (assuming jurisdiction under § 1581(i) in importer-initiated action
concerning requirements for reduction of penalties through voluntary disclosure),
See also Pentax Corp. v. Robinson, 125 F.3d 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (declining to
rule on jurisdictional issue), amended on reh'g, in part, 135 F.3d 760 (Fed. Cir.
1998); Tikal Distrib. Corp. v. United States, 970 F. Supp. 1056 (Ct. Int'l Trade
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Another serious jurisdictional issue in customs penalty
cases is that the CIT's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1582 is
limited to certain enumerated civil penalties under the cus-
toms laws.' In fact, the customs laws include several other
civil penalties or fines that are not enumerated in section 1582
and, consequently, would be within the jurisdiction of district
courts. Among the fines and penalties under the customs laws
whose recovery is not within the CIT's jurisdiction are: fines
for violations of the Foreign-Trade Zones Act;' penalties for
intentionally destroying, defacing, or removing country-of-ori-
gin labels;112 penalties for violating NAFTA record-keeping
requirements;' penalties for violating general record-keep-
ing requirements;' and penalties for aiding and abetting the
importation of goods in violation of an American trade-
mark. ' 5 Logically, all civil actions commenced by the United
States to recover civil penalties under the customs laws should
be heard in the CIT.
V. CONCLUSION
As the U.S. customs and international trade laws evolve,
there is a continuing need to evaluate the CIT's jurisdiction to
assure that it remains an effective forum for conducting judi-
cial review of agency action under those laws. This need is
particularly important because the decrease in the rates of
customs duties results in a corresponding decrease in tradition-
al customs litigation-the adjudication of disputes over the
assessment of customs duties.
In recognition of the importance of these issues, Chief
Judge Gregory W. Carman, of the CIT, established an Advisory
Committee on Jurisdiction in June 2000 to report to the court
on possible expansions of its jurisdiction. The CITBA proposals
1997) (dismissing action seeking recovery of voluntarily tendered duties for lack of
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted).
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1582 (1994) (giving the CIT jurisdiction "to recover a civil
penalty under §§ 592, 593A, 641(b)(6), 641(d)(2)(A), 704(i)(2), or 734(i)(2) of the
Tariff Act of 1930 [19 U.S.C. §§ 1592, 1593a, 1641(b)(6), 1641(d)(2)(A), 1671c(i)(2),
or 1673c(i)(2)] .... ").
101. See 19 U.S.C. § 81s (1994).
102. See id. § 1304(1).
103. See id. § 1508(e).
104. See id. § 1509(g).
105. See id. § 1526(f) (Supp. IV 1999).
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discussed above provide a foundation for the Advisory
Committee's consideration. The evaluation of potential expan-
sions of the CIT's jurisdiction also can take into account four
general principles: jurisdictional clarity (avoidance of confusion
over the intended allocation of jurisdiction); judicial expertise
(similarity to matters currently heard by CIT judges); jurisdic-
tional comprehensiveness (the creation of a jurisdictional sys-
tem in the CIT encompassing the field of customs and inter-
national trade law, as suggested in Part IV above); and judi-
cial efficiency (using the judicial resources of the CIT to reduce
the caseload in district courts by transferring cases to the CIT).
How these general principles and the jurisdictional proposals
made by CITBA and others are applied and shaped in future
legislative initiatives will help determine the path the CIT will
take in the twenty-first century.
